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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper investigates about the financial sector’s trend before 
and after the financial crisis 2007-2008 in the United States of 
America. Starting from the construction of a portfolio composed by 
56 firms belonged to this sector, we provide an explanation about 
the influence that banks and financial businesses have on the 
other sectors. This research verifies also if the financial sector 
had likely the worst reaction to the crisis. Furthermore, building 
two portfolios consisting of 7 firms each by information 
technology and industrial sectors (from S&P 500), we supply an 
overview about the reaction to the crisis. Another aspect we will 
explore is the influence of the leverage on American’s firms, 
starting from other paper’s assumptions. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Since the Black Thursday and the Great Depression, the crisis of 
2007 is one of the biggest financial crises in the last century 
(Bordo, 2008). All the stock market around the world felt the 
effects of the crash and what follows was the biggest destruction 
in equity value ever, from $51 trillion to $22 trillion, with 
persistent effects that mined the basics of some assumption at 
micro and macroeconomics level, and also is growing a convinced 
feel that the policy and regulations institution have to 
reconsider methods of analysis and solutions (Bartram, Bodnar, 
2009). In particular, the financial sector is one of the most 
important parts of the economic system, that provide credit to the 
company and can also influence the performance of the production 
economy, and its performance is linked with the rest of the market 
(Carlson, King, Lewis; 2008), which means that an unhealthy 
financial sector is dangerous for the economic environment, and 
can curb the globally economic development.       
Morrish (2012), about the crisis that hit United States of America 
during the biennium 2007/08, points the bank environment in 
conjunction with government policies, as the likely responsible of 
the recession period. It’s not correct to charge to the US 
financial sector all the global breakdown in the stock market but 
its variation in terms of negative performance widens the shocks 
in the rest of the economy (Carlson, King, Lewis; 2008). 
The economic decrease led to a chain reaction for which concerns 
the others sectors.  
 
Problem statement 
After the overview about the sequence of events and focusing on 
the evaluation of the consequences the crisis produced, we feel 
the needs to go deeper and analyse the relation between financial 
sector and other sectors: how is the trend of the financial system 
and did the others sectors follow it? Which response the other 
sectors give to the changes of the financial environment? 
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Our research focuses on the transformation of the financial sector 
in the United States of America. In particular, we collect from 
Bloomberg database the information about the trend of the 
financial system in order to understand if this sector had the 
worst reaction to the crisis. Another aspect we take into account 
is the development of the information technology sector and the 
industrial sector, but only for which regards relations before and 
after the crisis. We build a sample for the three sectors, 
focusing on the trend before and after the crisis. 
We provide also an explanation about the course of these sectors 
basing our research also considering the debt level of the 
business and concentrating on some exception (some business 
increased during the crisis). 
During our work on this paper we will give a rendition about the 
transformations of the market and which part of it dealt the 
crisis with more success. 
 
In the second chapter we consider the literature background, to 
have an overview of the events that happened across the crisis. In 
the following chapter, we give the definitions about the 
theoretical bases concerning this work, and also the description 
of the model for the manipulation of the data. After, in the 
fourth chapter, we have the trend and also the leverage analysis, 
with a brief overview of the performance off the sectors. In the 
last, we collect the results and give the answer to our project 
statement. 
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2. Literature backgrounds 
In this section we collect previous theories we need in order to 
develop our academic work. 
2.1 Crisis roots 
According to Didier, Love and Perìa (2010) and with the work of 
Shleifer-Vishny (2010), the crisis that starts in 2007 was 
transmitted all over the markets by financial environment. As 
Tragenna (2009) points out, before the actual crisis the condition 
of the bank profitability didn’t show earlier problems, rather the 
profits were higher than the past. Those two considerations may 
seem opposite one to the other, but the answer of this paradox 
(Lastra, Wood; 2010) is spread, and it is formed by many aspects, 
from the excessive leverage to the concept too-big-to-fail. They 
summarized these entire concepts in 10 macro-sections. First they 
discuss about the macroeconomics imbalances between US and China, 
because of the level of foreigners financing, which can be 
dangerous if there aren’t proper surveillance tools and 
regulations to keep under control the borrowing of funds. Is also 
notable the lax of monetary policy in the US, like also in 
supervision and in the recent new regulation. Fourth, the too-big-
too-fail mentality brought more and more risk to the bank account, 
increasing the vulnerability of the institution. Then, the excess 
of securitization and the derivatives market, the direct 
consequences of the weak control and supervision on the sector in 
the years before the break-point. Summarizing, the fail in risk 
management and corporate governance, together with the economics 
theory that were untrue or misleading, brought the situation to 
this ultimate step.      
So after the explosion of the subprime bubble, this combination of 
factors let the truth comes out, with all the consequences, policy 
and recommendations that came after that (Turner, 2009), trying to 
contain the damages. So, like the work of Didier, Love and Perìa 
(2010), the analysis for the bank sector is divided into 2 
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different phases, before and after 2008; besides that, there is 
another phase in the work who consider the whole period of 10 
years in the stock data, to have a better overview of the last 
decade in this sector. In the work of Meric, Goldberg, Sprotzer 
(2010) it’s analysed the bank sector trend for the period that 
goes from October 2002 to August 2009 and they confirmed the fact 
that before 2007 the performance for the sector was even better 
than the performance of the S&P500 Index. But as said before, the 
massive use of the leverage in the market in good times raised the 
risk of insolvency, because of the losses in net income for the 
sector and in the meanwhile, the rise of the provisions, took the 
sector into the Bear Market period (Meric, Goldberg, Sprotzer; 
2010). One of the measures adopted by the banking institution was 
to reduce the interest rate, but that can affect the bank risk 
rating, like changes in evaluation of the cash flow or incomes or 
the comparison with the risk free government securities: this last 
change can modify the institutional behaviour of the entity, and 
can incentivize risky policy from the company to improve the 
profitability (Altunbas, Gambacorta, Marques-Ibanez; 2010). 
 
A problem for which concerns the crisis is given by the leverage 
the banks use to finance themselves. In particular, Schildbach 
(2009) wrote that an excessive leverage could be one of the main 
reasons of the financial crisis. Indeed, the high ratio between 
the subprime-related losses and banks’ capital levels caused fear 
and uncertainty about the counterparty risk among banks. Regarding 
this analysis, he notices a high level of debt in firms belonged 
to the financial sector, due to a low cost of capital in the pre-
crisis era. In particular, Petersen and Ryan (1995) point out that 
in the United States is easily for young firms to gather loans 
from banks. They provide evidence about the use of lending 
practices. A downside of this theory is that firms in U.S. markets 
are more difficult to pay. Furthermore, to reinforce this theory,  
Cetorelli e Gambera (2001) demonstrate that a concentrated banking 
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system facilitates young firms to gather loans in order to enhance 
the growth rate. 
Another problem is represented by the use of capital requirements 
(by banks) in order to take away a large scale of trading books 
and into structured investment vehicles. Moreover, as Schildbach 
(2009) points out, the nominal leverage ratios have an hardly 
effect on risk. On one hand, it increases the risk, on the other 
hand, it makes harder noticing the transparency on the banks’ true 
level of risk. In this scenario, investors are encouraged to 
groped hazard in the financial market. 
 
2.1 Does the financial system affect the economy? 
The problem of leverage regards not only the financial system, but 
also firms belonged to other sectors. In fact, Rajan and Zingales 
(1998) explain the theory according to which sectors much reliant 
on loans grow more than proportionally with deep financial system 
(as United States). This happens during non-crisis period, instead 
during crisis periods, the opposite occurs. Namely, the relation 
becomes tragic as at that time these sectors decrease these 
performance disproportionately in countries with deep financial 
system, such United States have. However, in this analysis there 
is a favorable point of view for which regarding the American 
financial sector, namely it is efficient about adopting some 
constraints to take over control the firms. In fact, as Laeven, 
Klingebiel, Kroszner (2002) point out, it is easier in countries 
with deep financial system.  
Beck (1991) shows how the firms are encouraged about using 
external financial resources considering it as a source of a 
comparative advantage. In fact, he develops the theory according 
to which in countries with developed financial system, industries 
export more shares. 
Wurgler (2000) explains that, during period of growth, an 
investment could increase more than 7 per cent on average in the 
United States (developed financial system), while in India only 1 
per cent (lower financial system). We explained the effect of the 
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leverage on firms not only belonged to financial sector, but also 
on businesses of other sectors.  
 
Now the step is seeking for influence of the first on the others.  
In particular, we should take a look about the trend of the other 
sectors related to the financial system.  
 Bartram and Bodnar (2009) analyzed the trend of the financial 
sector compared to non-financial sectors. The fall of financial 
sector return index (in USD) is more significant (-63.9%) compared 
to the non-financial sector (-38.3%) during the period spread from 
31 of December 2006 to 27 of February 2009. Also the risk of the 
financial sector returns is about double higher than the non-
financial sector returns. In 2007, the non-financial sector has 
more than 20% in term of expected returns, while the financial 
sector performance is low (0,03%) and the standard deviation is 
comparable to the non-financial sector, but still higher. The 
global financial firms start going down on April and mid-July of 
2008, beginning an unrelenting decline, with minor respites in 
April and mid-July of 2008, falling 51.7% in 2008, as under 
evidence (40.5%) is during the highest point of the crisis from 
September through the end of October. The financial sector ends 
down also on 2009 (25,6%). For which concerns the non-financial 
sector, it keeps its trend through late spring 2008. After that it 
starts a decline going down 40.6% in 2008 with a drop of 35.7% 
during the maximum period of the crisis. Indeed, the performance 
of the non-financial sector spreads all over the period is better 
than the financial sector. 
Bartram and Bodnar (2009) performed also the trend of other 
sectors, as the industrial sector. They provide evidence showing 
that the industries used in their analysis followed the same trend 
as the aggregate financials industry. In particular, U.S Banks 
underperformed the other industries. During the period 2006-2009 
the financial system falls and the industrial firms start decline 
following the pattern. In particular, the industrial sector has 
suffered most than the other sectors. It went down in value 20% 
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more than any of the other U.S. sectors, falling to 71% since the 
end of 2006. Most of the industries had a flat trend before the 
crisis period: in the United States, the period of the Bear Market 
hits all industries and also comparably. Industrials gave up 25% 
and financials another 33% in the first two months of the year 
2009. Financials have other periods of crisis comparable to the 
2008, as in the first two months of 2009. Indeed, the financials 
had the worst fall dated December 1, 2008, with a 15% loss. 
 
 
King and Levine (1993) provide an overview about the correlation 
between companies operating in financial system and economic 
growth. They argued that these firms influence the economy thank 
to the services they supply allocating capital and risk in the 
economy. Gibson (1995), have shown that declines on the Japanese 
banks' trend make the customers reluctant to invest. Further, Peek 
and Rosengren (2000) find that the deterioration of Japanese 
banks has a bad effect  in the activity of the U.S. commercial 
real estate markets that were dependent onJapanese bank lending.  
Furthermore, Guiso, Kashyap, Panetta, and Terlizzese (2002) 
explain that investing on securities have a correlation with the 
trend in financing costs. Indeed, as  Bernanke (1983)  points out, 
it seems there is an effect made by the deterioration of financial 
system on macroeconomic environment. He studied the Great 
Depression period in the U.S and notices that bank failures 
declined economic 
activity. Other authors, for example Aspachs, Goodhart, Tsomocos, 
and Zicchino (2007) explain that increases in the bank default 
probability make an arrest on GDP growth. Moreover,Lown, Morgan, 
and Rohatgi (2000) analyzing the impact of the share of loan 
officers reporting in the Federal Reserve’s Senior Loan Officer 
Opinion Survey of Bank Lending Practices, they notice that tighter 
lending standards make slower the loan growth and has predictive 
power for output growth. Thus, if a deterioration in the condition 
of banks causes banks to tighten their lending standards, this 
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result could explain how bank trend affects investment. Carlson,  
King, and Lewis (2008) created an index which perform the 
financial sector during three decades. Their results provide 
evidence about the relation between financial stability and 
corporate investment, and that deterioration in the health of the 
financial sector put restraints on macroeconomic performance. 
Indeed, they find that changes in the financial sector seem to 
amplify shocks to other parts of the economy. 
Using this literature we are now approaching to the analysis to 
verify the trend of the sectors. 
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3. Perspective, theory, and approach 
In this section we are going to give an explanation about which 
perspective we use for our work, looking for the theories we follow 
and how we applied them in order to answer to our focus. First, we 
will take an overview to the perspective involved in this academic 
field and in particular in our project. After that we will show which 
methodological approach we adopted to evaluate the data and the 
analysis. First, we define some concepts we are going to use in order 
to value our work. 
 
Positivism is a theoretical perspective, grown from the path of 
objectivism, and this perspective finds its environment into social 
research.  
Buckingham and Saunders (2004) explain that positivism is a variant of 
empiricism. In their explanation the authors are along others such as 
(Bryman 2012), (Zikmund et al. 2012), and (Silverman 2010), and 
(Creswell 2008) who see empiricism as a philosophical tradition, which 
believes that (a) the world consists of objects, (b) these objects 
have their own characteristics and properties which exists 
irrespective of what one may think they are like, and (c) knowledge of 
these objects is developed through direct experience of them. 
Positivism is a variant of empiricism. Positivistic approach is used 
within a project philosophy that is inspired by problem-oriented-
project-work (Olsen and Pedersen 2008).  
Here, positivists endorse empiricists' belief that there is a real 
world of objects that we can know only through experience, but they 
add to this some additional rules about how such knowledge is to be 
achieved. In fact the purpose of the positivism nowadays is not to 
find certainty, absolute objectivity and the totality of the truth but 
it focuses on the research of the approximation to the truth, with a 
certain level of objectivity, and the certainty is replaced by the use 
of probability (Crotty, 1998). This perspective is useful for our 
research because the results obtained are involved in a deeper context 
than we are able to understand, and the multitude of relations implied 
in the subject we analysed do not permit the absolute assert of the 
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certainty about the relations and the results we found out.  For 
example, the analysis of historical data permit an analysis for the 
past but it doesn’t concern the possibility to build a rule for the 
state of things, and the relations between the trend of the sectors 
are affected also by other variables that we cannot understand or we 
do not even know, so the analysis it’s a portion of the truth, not the 
truth itself. 
 
3.1 Quantitative method 
After the description of which perspective we used in the project, 
here we give an explanation of the analysis method involved. 
We decide to use this approach start looking for the nature of our 
data, which comprehend prices and trend. Also, the procedure of the 
analysis involves mathematical evaluation and analysis: the need for a 
fine evaluation of the results pushed us to look for something that 
fits these processes, as the quantitative method. 
According to Bryman (2012), if a concept has to be measured, there is 
the need for a quantitative approach. This method has a specific 
process in order to evaluate the problem posed at the beginning: it 
starts from the collect of the theory on which the hypothesis bases, 
creating a link between them and putting the focus for the research: 
in our case, we first researched for the theory inherent to our idea 
and then, we start going through that to formulate the hypothesis, the 
base for the instrumental and design research. After this section, 
there are the research steps, which concern the selection of subject 
and proper data, useful for the evaluation.  The work going further 
with the data processing: here we use all the mathematical equation 
and calculation to provide evidence to data analysis. After that, we 
are able to start with the analysis part, which is followed by the 
conclusions and references to the theory. With our work, we were 
supported on our conclusions by the theory collected before: in fact, 
the entire project is pointed to verify or refute the assertion made 
in the past literature.  
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3.2 Definitions used 
As we mentioned in the introduction, this part of the paper 
provides to explain concepts and elements we need in order to 
develop the construction of the portfolios. For the formulas we 
only use the book “Corporate Finance: The Core, 2/E” written by 
Berk and DeMarzo (2010). 
  
 
3.2.1 Building a Portfolio 
In order to build a portfolio, we now define the concepts to 
develop the work: expected return, variance, volatility, 
covariance and correlation.  
3.2.2 Expected Return 
Elton and Gruber (2003) define the return of a portfolio as the 
weighted average of the return on the single assets. In order to 
build a an average between the assets, first you need to define 
the weight of the share. If    is the ith return on the portfolio 
and    is the amount of the investor’s fund invested in the ith 
asset, the formula of the expected return ( (  )) is:                
 (  )  ∑     
 
      (1) 
From this equation can be derived the formula of the expected 
return of a portfolio, which is the weight average of the expected 
return on the individual assets. Knowing that the expected value 
of the sum composed by many assets is the sum of the expected 
value, the expected return of a portfolio can be written with this 
equation: 
 (  )  ∑  (    )  
 
   ∑        
 
      (2) 
The final result means that the expected value of a constant times 
a return is a constant times the expected return (Elton and Gruber 
(2003)). 
 
3.2.3 Covariance of a portfolio 
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Elton and Gruber (2003) define the covariance between 2 securities 
is a measure of how the assets move together and its formula, as 
Berk and DeMarzo (2010) write, is: 
   (    )   [     [  ]      [  ] ]   (3) 
The covariance is the product of the deviation of the first 
security from its mean multiplied for the deviation of the second 
security from its mean. It gives us information about how the 
securities move together in the portfolio. For example, if the 
deviations of the securities from their average are both positive 
or both negative, the result is positive. In this case the 
securities move in the same direction (there is no 
diversification) and the whole value of the variance (and the 
volatility) will be higher. Conversely, with a negative covariance 
the value of the variance (and the volatility) will be lower. It 
means that the two securities move in opposite direction and 
accordingly the value of the variance (and volatility) decreases. 
If the deviations of the securities are unrelated the covariance 
tends to be zero. 
 
 Variance of a portfolio 
Elton and Gruber (2003) define the variance of a portfolio is a 
measurement of how the actual returns of a group of securities 
making up a portfolio fluctuate. Portfolio variance considers at 
the standard deviation of each security in the portfolio in the 
way of how those single securities correlate with the others in 
the portfolio. In particular, it focuses at the covariance or 
correlation coefficient for the securities in the portfolio. 
Generally, a lower correlation between the securities makes lower 
the variance of the portfolio. The formula is indicates that the 
variance of a portfolio is equal to the sum of the covariance of 
all the couples of shares into the portfolio, each of them 
multiplied by the respective weights in the portfolio:  
   (  )  ∑ ∑        (    )
 
   
 
      (4) 
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3.2.5 Volatility of a portfolio 
Elton and Gruber (2003) define the volatility of a portfolio is 
simply the square root of the variance of such portfolio, as we 
can see through the formula: 
       √          (5) 
The volatility indicates the level of uncertainty (the risk of the 
asset) about the entity of changes in a security’s value. A high 
level of volatility means that the security’s value is dealt out 
over a large set of values. In this perspective, considering the 
price of the security, it can change many times in either 
direction, all in a short time period. Conversely, a low 
volatility means that the security’s value changes in value at a 
steady pace for a certain period of time.  
 
3.2.6 Correlation 
Elton and Gruber (2003) define the correlation between two 
securities as the covariance of the returns divided by the 
standard deviation of each return: 
    (     )  
         
            
   (6) 
It is a measure to control the volatility of each stock, in order 
to verify the strength the securities have between them. Dividing 
for the volatilities we make sure the values that the correlation 
assumes are between “-1” and “+1”. If the value is “-1” the 
securities move in opposite directions, otherwise with a value of 
“+1” the assets move in the same direction. 
The correlation is therefore a measure of how the securities in a 
portfolio write off the risk by combining themselves. This is a 
sort of introduction to the concept of “diversification” which is 
so important in the construction of a portfolio in order to remove 
risk. 
 
3.2.7 Different aspects to take into account 
Composing and analyzing a portfolio of only firms that belong to 
the same sector we would expect a high correlation and therefore 
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high variance and volatility. Such result is given by absence of 
diversification since the businesses are influenced from the same 
type of economic events. The diversification of a portfolio is the 
process through which the diversifiable risk of the firms is 
eliminated. This allows reducing risk, but that is possible only 
by investing in a variety of assets. The way to realize that is 
trying to match securities with opposite correlation and moreover, 
increasing the number of assets of the portfolio. 
In the portfolios we are going to build we will take only seven 
businesses for each sector, so we expect portfolios with high 
variance and volatility. 
Being interested only in analyzing the trend of the sectors before 
and after the financial crisis in the years 2007/08, in this case 
it is not important combining assets that move in opposite 
directions in order to delete risk. In other words, we are only 
interested about the trend of the sectors. 
 
 Delineating efficient portfolios 
To build an efficient frontier we need to delineate the efficient 
portfolios: in this perspective the correlation assumes a primary 
role. As over written, correlation allows reducing risk of the 
portfolio adding and combining securities’ trends. This is 
possible considering the standard deviation of a portfolio: it is 
not the weighted average of the standard deviation of each asset. 
So, the various methods to build an efficient frontier regard the 
way of mixing securities always bearing in mind the best 
combination. 
Elton and Gruber (2003) explain that in case of perfect negative 
correlation (-1) between the assets, the risk of the portfolio 
should go down as the final formula of the standard deviation 
between two securities suggests: 
  (  )  √[  
           
                      (  )           ]   (7) 
Namely, the standard deviation of the portfolio composed by assets 
“a” and “b” and the respective weights “Xa” and “Xb” in the 
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portfolio, eliminates the risk at his maximum. In this case 
diversification is the maximum possible and it means “no risk”. 
If the correlation is perfectly positive (+1), the formula 
becomes: 
 (  )  √[  
           
                      (  )           ]   (8) 
In this case the correlation promotes a linear combination of risk 
of the securities, which means the standard deviation of the 
portfolio is simply the weighted average of standard deviation of 
the assets. 
Another limit case is represented from the absence of correlation 
between the securities (Corr=0). The formula becomes: 
 (  )  √[  
           
                      (  )           ]  
     = √[  
           
        ]   (9) 
In this case the volatility is decreased, even if not such as with 
perfect negative correlation. 
 
Efficient frontier 
Berk and DeMarzo (2010) explain the concept of short position, 
which is an investment with a negative amount in a stock. This is 
the opposite of a positive investment in an asset, which is called 
long position. The first one described above refers to a short 
sale, namely a selling trade of a stock you don’t have as 
property.  
Now we can build the efficient frontier with many risky assets: if 
there are many securities that can be used to form the investor's 
portfolio, we can construct many combination lines. However, as 
Berk and DeMarzo (2010) explain, for a given level of risk an 
investor will only consider the portfolio with the highest 
expected return. The set of such portfolios is called the 
efficient frontier, and is shown below. 
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FIGURE1: EFFICIENT FRONTIER OF RISKY ASSETS 
 
This chart explains also the effect of diversification given by 
adding many assets to the portfolio: the risk is decreased. The 
set shows us the efficient frontier for risky assets and it gives 
us the best possible volatility and return combinations. 
 
3.2.10 Borrowing and lending at the risk-free rate 
In this scheme we consider an efficient frontier with riskless 
lending and borrowing, considering borrowing as a security that 
can be taken at the riskless rate (Rf). Berk and DeMarzo (2010) 
explain that, combining an investment in securities at the risk 
free rate (Treasury Bills) with a normal portfolio of expected 
return equal to “  ”. The weight of the investment in the normal 
portfolio is “ ”, while the fraction in risk-free securities is 
“(   )” with a yield of “  ”. The expected return of the new 
portfolio ( [   ]]) is:  
 [   ]            [   ]   
           ( [  ]    )    (10) 
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The term “ [  ]    ” means the portfolio’s risk premium, the 
expected return of this portfolio is the addition between the 
investment in risk-free assets and risk activities. 
For regarding the standard deviation of this portfolio, as we 
explained above, the investment on risk free securities makes the 
volatility decrease. Since the risk free assets have volatility 
equal to zero, the only risk of the new set regard only the amount 
invested on risk securities. So, the variance of the portfolio is: 
   (   )       
          
    (  )                      (11) 
The volatility of this portfolio is:  
  (   )            (12) 
In this combinations set we can decide of increasing or decreasing 
the investment in risky assets, depending by the investor’s 
attitude about risk. But now we have the representation of the 
possibly mix by investing in securities with or without risk. 
From the chart below we can notice that the riskless investment 
implies buying an amount of stock only in Treasury Bills. Vice 
versa, an investor disposed to risk likely purchase more risky 
assets in order to have higher expected return, at the price of 
higher volatility. 
 
 
FIGUR 2: PORTFOLIO WITH RISKY AND RISK-FREE ASSETS 
 
3.2.11 The Sharpe Ratio 
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In order to define the perfect amount to invest in a combination 
of securities with and without risk, we need to know which is the 
highest possible expected return for any level of volatility. Berk 
and DeMarzo (2010) show that the slope of the line through a 
portfolio P passes, is given by the Sharpe Ratio: 
Sharpe Ratio = Portfolio risk’s premium / Portfolio Volatility 
             =   [  ] –                 (13) 
So, the portfolio adapted to combine with the risk-free activity 
is the one with the highest Sharpe Ratio. This Portfolio is given 
by the tangent point between the line of the risk-free investment 
and the efficient frontier of risky investments. 
 
FIGUR 3: TANGENCY PORTFOLIO 
The chart above indicates the new efficient frontier, the Security 
Market Line (CML), considering the investment not only on risky 
assets, but also buying securities at the risk-free rate. The 
investor’s choice now consists only in how much to invest in the 
tangent portfolio versus the risk-free investment. 
 
3.2.12 Beta 
To improve the portfolio shown above we have to combine the 
perfect weights on investments with risk-free rate and risky 
assets. In order to reach the best Sharpe Ratio, we can consider a 
new investment “i” and the resulting volatility it leads to 
Portfolio, which depends from the correlation that i has in common 
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with portfolio. The improvement will be record, as Berk and 
DeMarzo (2010) write, only if: 
 
 [  ] –                          
   [  ] –   
      
   (14) 
The first term of the equation ( [  ] –   )is the additional return 
the investment on the asset “i” contributes to the portfolio. 
Instead, the second part of the equation measures the incremental 
risk given by adding the investment on “i” (                   ) 
multiplied by the Sharp Ratio of the portfolio “P” without such 
investment (
   [  ] –   
      
).Now, we simply define the Beta (  ) of the 
investment i with the portfolio P, which measures the sensitivity 
of such security related to the fluctuations of the portfolio: 
                             
(                  ]
  (  )
   (15) 
So, the investor will invest only if:  
 [  ]             [  ] –       (16)  
It means that the expected return of the investment on the new 
asset increases the return of the portfolio only if  [  ]  exceeds 
the required return (         [  ] –    ). In other words, an investor 
will continue buying the security i until the gain due to it will 
exceed the increase in volatility which leads to Portfolio summed 
to the risk-free rate. 
So, the point with the highest Sharpe Ratio represents the 
efficient portfolio, in which: 
 [  ]         
   
   [    ] –       (17)  
Extrapolating the meaning from the formula above, a portfolio is 
efficient only if the expected return of a security equals its 
required return. 
 
3.3 CAPM assumptions 
The model used to find the efficient frontier is the CAPM model, 
which is based on the Markowitz’s mean-variance model. In 
particular (from ReadyRatios Database): 
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1. The aim is to maximize economic assets. 
2. Investors are risk-averse and rational. 
3. The results cannot influence price (price takers). 
4. Lending and borrowing securities at the risk-free rate is 
permitted. 
5. Investors have the same information and they can reach them at 
the same time. 
6. There are no transaction costs. 
7. Securities are divisible in small parts. 
8. Results can be diversified across a set of investments. 
On these assumptions base we can write the formula to determine 
the risk premium of the market: 
 [  ]            [    ] –       (18)    
The risk premium of a security (     [    ] –    ) is equal to the 
market risk premium multiplied for the market risk which is inside 
the security’s return. The beta of this portfolio is:  
   ∑         (19) 
It means that the beta of a portfolio is the weighted average beta 
of the securities that are in the portfolio. 
This is the equation of the security market line (SML), which 
measures the relation between the beta and the expected return: 
 
FIGURE 4: SYSTEMATIC RISK 
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3.4 The leverage 
There are many firms that use external resources to gather capital 
and starting the business. This part of the paper provide 
collecting information about why companies do not use own capital 
at the beginning of their own activity. In particular, under the 
CAPM assumptions, we examine the advantages of the leverage. 
 
3.4.1 Cost of capital 
Berk and De Marzo (2010) split the cost of capital on two cases: 
on one hand with unlevered equity, on the other hand with levered 
equity (     ). They start explaining since the concept of perfect 
capital markets condition, according to which:  
1. Investors and firms trade the same set of securities at a 
competitive market prices equal to the present value of their 
future cash flows. 
2. There are no taxes and transaction costs for which concerns 
security trading. 
3. Decisions of firms do not influence the cash flows generated 
by investments and they do not provide new information about them. 
With these assumptions, in case of a business financed entirely 
with own capital, the firm values its investment using this 
formula: 
   
 
   
  
 
   
     (20) 
Namely, the unlevered equity (  ) is equal to the fraction of the 
business financed with own capital (
 
   
) multiplied by the cost of 
such equity (  ), plus the fraction of the business financed with 
debt (
 
   
) multiplied by the cost of such equity (  ). 
If there are not perfect capital markets assumptions, the formula 
changes taking into account also the effect of taxes. In 
particular, the Weighted Average Cost of Capital (     ) is a 
method to value a project investment for firms that want to use 
debt in order to finance the investment. It considers the effect 
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of the Interest Tax Shield (  D). So, the Weighted Average Cost of 
Capital is: 
      
 
   
  
 
   
       )   (21) 
Writing the formula in a different way: 
      
 
   
  
 
   
   
 
   
       (22)       
The term ”
 
   
    ” is the reduction due to Interest Tax Shield. We 
can see that higher the debt of the firm, lower is the cost of 
capital. From this equation we notice how firms are encouraged 
about using debt.  
 
3.4.2 Debt-Equity Ratio (D/E) 
We use this ratio in order to explain some borderline cases we 
found in our work. It measures the level of leverage the firms use 
to finance the business (Berk and De Marzo (2010)). 
 
 
3.5 Methodology 
Our work is focused on the mathematical financial explanation of 
the phenomenon that we observed, and the need of numerical data 
was the primary goal. Because of the complexity nature of the data 
and the inability to process them manually, the elaboration has 
been done with Excel. Here we try to explain step-by-step the 
building of the portfolio, showing the theorical and mathematical 
passages, and describing the variables involved in this section. 
This part exclusively refers to the excel worksheet we made and 
it’s based on the book “Asset pricing”, written by John H. 
Cochrane (2000). 
 
3.5.1 Collecting data 
To be able to analyze our data and build the portfolio, we needed 
the information about the historical stock prices for each firm. 
The first problem was about the selection of the firms and the 
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related stock prices. The choice of the firms listed in the S&P500 
Index (Standard and Poor) is justified because this index is 
normally considered by the market portfolio. The S&P500 contains 
five hundred of the biggest US firm, that together are the 70% of 
the total US stock market. Noteworthy, this is one of the 
assumptions of the CAPM model and it could give different results 
if it’s used in a work with different theories, because under this 
model the diversification of this Index is the maximum, so it has 
only the systemic risk. Then, the next step was to decide which 
sectors choose as sample in the analysis, to make a comparison 
between them and the financial one. So, we focused on the 
Industrial and the Information Technology one. These portfolios 
are formed by 7 companies each, chosen considering the size of the 
company, the importance and visibility in the sector and the 
availability of the complete stock of data.  
 
Industrial  
Is the sector which comprehends companies whose production is 
about constructions material and industrial goods. Transport 
services, industrial engineering, electronic and electric 
equipment are just only few example of this wide sector. In this 
portfolio we have Agilent Technologies, Boeing, FedEx Corp., 
Lockheed Martin, L-3 Communications, Ingersoll-Rand, and Honeywell 
International. 
Information Technology (IT) 
This field has a lot of definition but we can surely describe it 
like the use of electronic device to spread and store data, and 
also communicate them and the way to manage those information 
transactions.  
In this portfolio we have Apple Inc., Adobe System, Applied 
Materials, Cisco System, Dell Inc., Google Inc. and Hewlett-
Packard. 
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Financial  
This is the focus of the work, and in this portfolio we have 56 
financial company, all the components of the sector in the S&P500 
Index. It’s formed not only by banks, but also from all the 
corporation involved in the production, sell and services 
providing in the financial environment (one example could be 
Moody’s, which is a credit rating agency). 
Problems  
Regarding the collect of data, we dealt with some issue as the 
lack in the disposability of data, because some historical series 
were incomplete or were totally missing. Hence, we based our 
analysis taking into account the companies listed in the S&P500, 
to approach the most we could the general trend of the sector, and 
give a convincing representation of the situation (since S&P500 
represents about 70% of the U.S. stock market). 
 
Expected return 
In order to find the composition of the portfolio, we estimate the 
weekly expected return with the stock prices data we reach. So, 
knowing that the Expected Return (E[Ri]) is the ratio between 
tR  
and 
1tR  , one example is  
=Data!CN10/Data!CN9-1  
With this equation we are able to find the return series for each 
company, and after that we consider also the Mean Return, Variance 
and Std. Deviation. For the Variance we used the specific 
mathematical function of Excel, and the standard form is  
=VAR.POP(B4:B569) 
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The same is for the standard deviation: usually you can calculate 
this parameter with the square root of the Variance, but even this 
time there is a proper function already filled in Excel, which is  
=DEV.ST.POP(B4:B569) 
The expected returns are fundamental to plot the covariance 
matrices, which are the next step in the process. 
Problems 
In this case we used the weekly expected returns, because of the 
source of the data; the issue about this method is that you have 
to find the proper free risk rate, which has to be weekly as well, 
otherwise the analysis between the returns and a free risk rate 
that cover a wider period of time (usually, all the analyst in the 
financial environment consider as free risk rate the 10 Years or 
30 Years rate of the treasury bunds) could distort the results and 
corrupt the work. 
   
Covariance matrix 
Input 
The operation in excel that involves the use of matricial equation 
or table needs different set of commands, to set the program in 
that modality. For all the other operations it’s sufficient the 
Enter command, but in this case it requires a set which has some 
step. First you have to enable the matrix modality, by entering F9 
command. After that, you can write the equation as usual but, to 
set that, there is the closing set mode to enter the matrix in the 
sheet, which is CTRL+SHIFT+ENTER. This operation is necessary 
every time you want to modify a matrix.     
Building 
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With the returns data, we are now able to build the Covariance and 
Inverse Covariance matrices. In this step, we are taking couple by 
couple all the firms return series, and using the equation 
=COVARIANCE.P(FINANCIAL!$C$4:$C$569;FINANCIAL!B$4:B$569) 
we can see the relation in the movement of the returns between all 
the different companies. After that, we can use the matrix method 
to build the Inverse Covariance Matrix, using the function in 
excel    
{=MINVERSE(B312:BE367)} 
 
Problems  
There could be some problems in the construction of the matrix, 
because of the number of variables or the entity of the 
calculation. In the compiling we faced a #NUM problem, because the 
value of the numbers calculated exceeded the maximum value which a 
cell can contain. In that case we were obliged to delete a firm 
because the maximum variables that we could put in this case were 
56. 
Calculation of portfolios 
The next step is about the construction of the portfolio: we use 
two portfolios, in order to build the efficient frontier of the 
risky investments. The first one uses a constant 0c  , meanwhile 
the second one use 0,01c  . Into the first one the variables 
included are Expected Returns, NN Portfolio and Portfolio’s 
weights. In the second one, corrected by the constant, we have the 
Corr. Constant, NN Portfolio and the Portfolio’s weights. 
Exp. Returns 
The expected returns used in the portfolio are not the simple 
returns that we calculate from the stock price, but they are built 
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from the Mean Return of each company. The Mean Return of each 
stock can be calculated with the average of all the weekly return 
=AVERAGE(B3:B277) 
After that, we have to manipulate that Mean Return using a matrix, 
to transpose the data in the column, with the caption 
{=TRANSPOSE(B307:BE307)} 
NN Portfolio 
The second variable to calculate needs another matrix equation 
that creates a relation between the Exp. Return, calculated in the 
step before, and the Inverse Covariance matrix: we are using here 
a multiplying matrix and the first member of the equation is the 
Inverse matrix, multiplied by the Exp. Return matrix 
{=MMULT(B378:BE433;B443:B498)}  
The same procedure is adopted by the second portfolio, except for 
the only difference that the members of the Multiplying Matrix are 
the Corr. Constant and the Inverse matrix.  
Portfolio weights 
The last step involves the calculation of the portfolio’s weights, 
and to evaluate them we need first the average of the Exp. Return 
and the sum of the NN Portfolio. They can be easily calculated 
using standard formulas 
=AVERAGE(B443:B498)  
for the returns and 
=SUM(C443:C498)  
for the NN Portfolio. So, after that, the weights are calculated 
with the ratio between the single NN Portfolio values of each 
company divided by the sum of all the value of NN Portfolio 
=C443/$C$506   
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Return and risk of the portfolio 
At this point, we can evaluate the main variables of the 
portfolio, which are the return of the portfolio, the variance and 
the standard deviation. Over the two portfolios that we calculated 
before, we have another one which mix those two, putting a 
constant 0,5a  : this is the portfolio on which we base the 
construction of the efficient frontier. 
Return 
First we have to evaluate the return of the first portfolio ( 0c  ) 
and in order to do that, we use a multiplying matrix, which 
contains as members the transpose matrix of the first portfolio 
weights and the returns 
 
{=MMULT(TRANSPOSE(D712:D767);B712:B767)} 
Then, with the second portfolio we use the same method but into 
the equations we put the transpose matrix of the second portfolio 
weights and the same return we used before 
{=MMULT(TRANSPOSE(I712:I767);B712:B767)} 
So the last step is to find the return of the mixed portfolio, 
and, remembering that 0,5a  , we have the result using the equation 
=B803*B797+(1-B803)*F797 
where B803 is the constant, B797 is the return of the first 
portfolio and F797 is the return of the second one.   
Variance 
To be able to evaluate the variance of the portfolio, we first 
have to find the covariance between the portfolios we found 
before. To do that, we have to relate the weights to the 
covariance matrix 
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{=MMULT(TRANSPOSE(D712:D767);MMULT(B577:BE632;I712:I767))} 
After this, we can find the variance of the mixed portfolio, which 
relate the constant 0,5a   to the variance and covariance  
=B803^2*B798+(1-B803)^2*F798+2*B803*(1-B803)*B801 
where B803 is 0,5a  ,  B798 is the variance of the first portfolio, 
B801 is the covariance of the portfolios and F798 is the variance 
of the second portfolio. To find the standard deviation, we need 
the square root of the variance 
=RADQ(B805) 
 
Efficient frontier 
The last step of our model is the chart of the efficient frontier; 
to build this, we use the risk and the return of the mixed 
portfolio, computed on the base of all the possible weights in 
order to find the perfect combination of the portfolio. 
Sharpe Ratio 
The need of the weekly risk free rate: we found that the free risk 
rate is 0,5%, so we discounted it for the total week of the year 
=1,005^(1/52)-1 
After that we use the return, and after these two steps 
=C810-$D$806 
=D810/B810 
We are able to find the ratio, remembering that $D$806 is the free 
risk weekly rate, C810 is the return of the specific portfolio and 
B810 is its risk.   
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4. Analysis 
To start the analysis of the work made with excel (we built 
efficient portfolios), we first consider the financial portfolio 
composed by 56 firms of the financial sector (from S&P500). After 
we will see the trend of the sector written above before and after 
the crisis, in order to give an overview about changes for which 
concerns the American market. We will analyze also the trends of 
the Information Technology sector and the Industrial sector. We 
will provide an explanation about the course of two sectors 
considering them before and after the crisis. We will examine also 
some companies of the portfolios built with excel, in order to 
explain the effect of the leverage on firms and the reaction to 
the crisis. Finally, we will explain if we notice a dependency 
between the two sectors composed of seven companies and the 
financial system. The tools we use to analyze the portfolios are 
the prices, the expected returns, the volatility (risk), and the 
Sharpe Ratio.  
 
4.1 Financial sector 
 
4.1.1 Portfolio from 4
th
 of January 2002 until 9
th
 of November 2012 
This portfolio measures the trend of the financial sector since 
2002 (appendix, table 3). 
 
Expected returns 
This portfolio has a weekly average expected return (measured on 
the Sharp Ratio) equal to 1,5156%, which is a low result that 
considers the whole period since 2002. Taking a look about the all 
companies taken individually, we notice that their expected 
returns overall decreased after the crisis. But this analysis is 
not efficient at all because it does not examine the level of 
risk. In particular, it is not possible plotting an improvement or 
a worsening for which concerns the expected return if we do not 
consider the risk that such shares take to get the return. In fact 
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we see many negative expected returns along all the period 
analyzed, but only with this parameter we are not be able to give 
a response for which regards the performance of the portfolio's 
component. 
 
Volatility 
In order to have an overview about the trend of the sector now we 
analyze the volatility of the shares. The standard deviation of 
the portfolio is 5,6189%. The result is not low, but we have to 
consider it in relation to the expected return.  
 
Sharpe Ratio 
As we explained before, the Sharpe Ratio measures the best 
expected return per level of risk. We found a Sharpe Ratio equal 
to 26,8033%.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.1.2 Portfolio from 4
th
 of January 2002 until 3
rd
 of August 2007 
This portfolio measures the trend of the financial sector until 
the first week of August (appendix, table 2), when  BNP Paribas 
terminated withdrawals from three hedge funds citing "a complete 
evaporation of liquidity", as Elliot (2012) said. 
 
FIGURE 5: TREND FINANCIAL SECTOR 2002-2012 
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Expected Return 
The weekly average expected return (measured on the Sharp Ratio) 
of this portfolio (1,7681%)  is bigger than the other found with 
the 10 year trend. In particular, as we can notice from the excel 
pages, the expected returns increased for almost all the 
businesses. Indeed, it seems that it was more convenient to buy 
the same securities for investors until the 3
rd
 of August 2007. 
But, as i wrote above, we have to misure also the volatility in 
order to verify if actually the performance was better. 
 
Volatility 
The volatility of this portfolio is 3,4228%. So, we notice that 
the risk of the shares before the crisis is lower compared to the 
whole trend spread over the years until 2012. 
 
Sharpe Ratio 
The Sharpe Ratio for this portfolio is 51,376%. So, there is an 
improvement for which concerns this ratio in this portfolio 
compared to the other. Effectively, already the results of the 
expected return and the risk of the portfolio suggested this 
proclivity. 
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FIGURE 6: FINANCIAL SECTOR 2002-2007 
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4.1.3 Portfolio from 10
th
 of August 2007 until 9
th
 of November 2012 
This portfolio (appendix, table 1) measures the impact of the 
financial crisis on the securities comprising the portfolio of the 
financial sector. 
 
Expected Return 
The weekly average expected return (measured on the Sharp Ratio) 
of this portfolio is increased and it is equal to 2,7639%.  
 
Volatility 
The volatility of this portfolio is 9,1501%. So, from this result 
is clear that after the crisis the the risk of the shares raised 
to an higher level for each financial company. 
 
Sharpe Ratio 
The Sharpe Ratio for this portfolio is 30,102% and it is higher 
than the ten-year period, but lower than the period before the 
crisis. 
 
FIGURE 7: FINANCIAL SECTOR 2007-2012 
  
Overview about the sector 
The results suggest a positive tendency to which Meric, Goldberg, 
Sprotzer (2010) have written about the crisis. In particular, we 
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provide evidence about the fall of the financial sector and its 
involvement into the Bear Market. 
Analyzing the results, they point out circumstances apparently 
paradoxical. In other words, we found an higher Sharpe Ratio for 
the trend during the Bear Market than during the ten-year period. 
This result is partially explained by the almost tripling value of 
the portfolio's risk. Namely, the higher expected return is offset 
by a level of risk which has tripled. In fact, if we consider the 
change of the expected return before the Bear Market to the 
crisis, we notice an increase less of twice the value. So, 
according to Schildbach (2009), probably the high ratio between 
the subprime-related losses and banks’ capital levels caused fear 
and uncertainty about the counterparty risk among banks. However, 
the Sharpe Ratio before the crisis is much higher than the others, 
underlining the better performance of the sector during that 
period. 
 
 
4.2 Information Technology 
 
4.2.1 Portfolio from  4
th
 of January 2002 until 9
th
 of November 2012 
This portfolio measures the trend of the information technology 
sector since 2002 (appendix, table 9). 
 
Expected Return 
The weekly average expected return (measured on the Sharp Ratio) 
of this portfolio is 2,5512%. 
 
Volatility 
The volatility of this portfolio is 13,6784%, which seems an high 
risk considering the expected return of the portfolio. The risk is 
higher than the average of the average of the shares' standard 
deviation (4,64%) taken individually. This means that the 
correlation between the firms' shares moves in the same direction 
(>0). 
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Sharpe Ratio 
The Sharpe Ratio of this portfolio is 18,5811%. 
 
 
4.2.2 Portfolio from 4
th
 of January 2002 until 3
rd
 of August 2007 
This portfolio measures the trend of the information technology 
sector before the Bear Market (appendix, table 8). 
 
Expected Return 
The weekly average expected return of the portfolio before the 
Bear Market is 1,7399%. This result is lower than the one found 
for the ten-year trend. However, its meaning should be compared 
with the risk of the security. 
 
Volatility 
The volatility of the portfolio is 8,3461%. We notice a decrease 
of five percentage points from the previous portfolio. So, there 
was lower risk for the same securities that compose the portfolio 
before the crisis. 
 
FIGURE 8: IT SECTOR 2002-2012 
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Sharpe Ratio 
The value of the Sharpe Ratio is 20,7315%. The capital market line 
has an higher slope in this portfolio comparing it with the other 
one of the ten-year period. 
 
 
4.2.3 Portfolio from 10
th
 of August 2007 until 9
th
 of November 2012 
This portfolio describes the trend of the information technology 
sector after the crisis, in order to have a view about the changes 
in the market (appendix, table 7). 
 
Expected Return 
The weekly average expected return of this portfolio is 3,7947%. 
This value is higher than the other portfolios of the same sector. 
Now, we analyze the risk of the securities in order to se if it 
increased during such period. 
 
Volatility 
The volatility of this period is 15,0142%. We notice that such 
value is the highest for which concerns the information technology 
sector. 
FIGURE 9: IT SECTOR 2002-2007 
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Sharpe Ratio 
The value of the Sharpe Ratio is 25,2102%. It represents the 
highest value of the information technology sector. 
 
 
4.2.4 Overview about the sector 
As in the financial sectors there are many results that do not 
seem conformed to the theory. In particular, the highest Sharpe 
ratio calculated for the sector is the one since the crisis 
(25,2102%). However, if we consider the risk (15,0142%) and the 
expecting return (3,7947%) of this portfolio, we notice that they 
are the highest as well. In the period before the fall of the 
financial system the expected return (1,7399%) and the volatility 
(8,3461) are lower than the portfolio described just above. The 
Sharpe ratio (20,7315%)is lower as well. Indeed, it seems that the 
investors earn more money since the crisis happened. However is 
possible to analyze the results from another point of view, in 
particular considering the volatility of the portfolio. The 
increase on the level of risk of the portfolio scares investors 
causing discouragement about investing money. 
FIGURE 9: IT SECTOR 2007-2012 
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4.3 Industrial sector 
 
4.3.1 Portfolio from 4
th
 of January 2002 until 9
th
 of November 2012 
This portfolio measures the trend of the industrial sector since 
2002 (appendix, table 6). 
 
Expected Return 
The weekly average expected return in this portfolio is 0,2%, 
which is one of the lowest expected return between all the sector 
we analyzed.  
 
Volatility 
The standard deviation in this case is 3,207%; if we consider the 
average of the standard deviation of all the firms in the 
portfolio, 4,26%, it means that the securities are moving in 
opposite way, diversifying the risk. 
 
Sharpe Ratio 
The Sharpe Ratio is 5,936%, and this is the lowest value compared 
to the portfolios made before and after the crisis. 
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4.3.2 Portfolio from the 4
th
 of January 2002 until 3
rd
 of August 
2007 
This portfolio measures the performance of the industrial sector 
during the Bull Market (appendix, table 5). 
 
Expected Return 
In this period the weekly average expected return is higher 
compared to the portfolio that covers the decade: 0,303%. 
 
Volatility 
According to the trend and the variation of the other portfolios, 
the standard deviation is 2,297%, the lowest in the periods 
considered. 
 
Sharpe Ratio 
The Sharpe Ratio increase, reaching a value of 12,764%, the 
highest off all the period considered. 
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FIGURE 10: INDUSTRIAL SECTOR 2002-2012 
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FIGURE 11: INDUSTRIAL SECTOR 2002-2007 
 
 
4.3.3 Portfolio from the 10
th
 of August 2007 until 9
th
 of November 
2012 
This portfolio measures the performance of the industrial sector 
during the Bear Market (appendix, table 4). 
 
Expected Return 
After the drop on the stock market in 2007, the weekly average 
expected return increases of 3 percentage point, to the value of 
3,360%. This is the highest value we calculate in all the period 
considered. 
 
Volatility 
Like the substantial growth of the expected return, also the 
standard deviation increases its value, fifteen times the value of 
the 2002-2007 period:49,511%. 
 
Sharpe Ratio 
In this case the value of the ratio (6,768%) is higher compared to 
the 10 year portfolio, but it’s 2 times lower than the Sharpe 
index of the 2002-2007 period. 
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FIGURE 12: INDUSTRIAL SECTOR 2007-2012 
 
4.3.4 Overview about the sector  
According to our analysis, we notice substantial differences 
between the periods before-after 2007, in both terms of risk and 
return. That is coherent with the trend of the other sectors, 
which had similar performance in term of trend: in fact, the 
different proportion in changes about risk and return are 
remarkable. In this case, the return after the crisis is 3,360%, 
meanwhile before is 10 times lower: 0,303%. But the change in term 
of risk is even more intense: from the value of 2,297% it grows to 
49,511%.             
Another aspect is that the Sharpe ratio, compared with the period 
before the crisis, decreases substantially, from 12,764% of the 
2002-2007 portfolio, to 6,768% of the last portfolio. That 
suggests that in this sector the investors are discouraged to 
invest, and consider more relevant the growth of the risk than the 
growth of the return. 
 
4.4 Overview of the 3 sectors 
After our analysis, we can notice notable differences between the 
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return is similar for all of them, despite some exception where 
the higher return was followed by a higher increase of risk. Also 
considering the Sharpe ratio, the financial and industrial sector 
has the same decreasing trend. Instead, the information technology 
Sharpe ratio has a positive trend: this suggest that the 
industrial sector follow the financial trend, meanwhile the IT 
sector continue to attract investor, despite the substantial 
increasing in the value of the risk.   
 
4.5 Borderline cases and leverage 
For our analysis we decide to spread the view into 3 different 
portfolio sector, which are IT, Financial and Industrial sector. 
One of our goals for the project work is to try to understand the 
relations between these economic stock sectors and try to find 
different perspective for the investor analysis. For the IT sector 
and the Industrial one we found 7 different companies, all of them 
from the S&P500 index. We found the stock price data since the 
2002 so our analysis contains a view for the last 10 years, which 
is a fair amount of time to use in the work. 
So, starting with the first portfolio, the Information Technology 
one, we give an explanation about some interesting cases of 
companies which are related to the use of the leverage ratio (from 
Damodaran Database). 
Information Technology 
IT has a lot of definition but we can surely describe it like the 
use of electronic device to spread and store data, and also 
communicate them and the way to manage those information 
transactions. In this portfolio we have Apple Inc., Adobe System, 
Applied Materials, Cisco System, Dell Inc., Google Inc. and 
Hewlett-Packard. 
Apple Inc.  
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With the data of the stock price we have, we can surely notice a 
stable and increasing growth in the prices, reaching, in the last 
period, a price whose over 500$, and a 10-years growth of the 
4500%. At this moment it has 13.558.800 stocks in the market, and 
the price is 535$ per share. Apple constitutes an outlier in the 
portfolio we built, namely most of the other firms had an increase 
on the risk and a decrease on the mean expected return. This is 
partially shown by the leverage ratio "Market D/E" of the firm, 
which is equal to 0,00% on (January 2011). In other words, Apple 
does not suffer the crisis since it does not have an increase on 
its risk on the level of debt. 
 
FIGURE 13: TREND APPLE 
 
Hewlett- Packard 
The stock graph is characterized by really unstable period, with 
substantial earn and loss in prices. However, it’s really notable 
the last trend, considering the period that starts at the 
beginning of 2010: the prices drop from 53,42$ per share to about 
14$ per share nowadays. We should consider Hewlett-Packard as an 
interesting case for the effect of the leverage. In particular, 
the Market D/E for this firm is equal to 59,50% (January 2011). 
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This means that Hewlett-Packard financed the business with debt 
and now is paying the interest on it. 
Also the other firms considered for the high technology sector 
follow the trend of Hewlett-Packard but it costitutes the more 
relevant example of the effect of leverage. 
 
FIGURE 14: TREND HEWLETT-PACKARD 
Industrial 
This is the sector which comprehends companies whose production is 
about constructions material and industrial goods. Transport 
services, industrial engineering, electronic and electric 
equipment are just only few example of this wide sector. In this 
portfolio we have Agilent Technologies, Boeing ,FedEx Corp., 
Lockheed Martin, L-3 Communications, Ingersoll-Rand, Honeywell 
International. 
L-3 Communications 
The data of the stock prices define two trend in the last 10 
years, one until April of 2008 and one after that: respectively, 
the first one was made by a positive trend and a substantial 
growth, from a price of 40$ in 2002 to the maximum in April of 
2008 of 109$. The second one is a negative non smoothed trend, 
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with up-down in the prices spread all over the year. The mean 
expected return after the crisis is negative and equal to -0,02%, 
while before it is 0,03%. Furthermore, the risk is increased 
passing from 3,49% to 3,43%. L-3 Communications follows the flow 
of the financial sector and it has a Market D/E of 61,4% (January 
2011). Also in this case the debt costraints the firm to pay an 
higher risk during the crisis. 
 
FIGURE 15: TREND L-3 COMMUNICATIONS 
 
Boeing 
In this case, we can distinguish 4 different phases in the price 
data: the first one, starts on the beginning of 2002 and lasted 
for 1 year, characterized by a brief fall; the second one, a very 
pronounced positive trend, that brought the prices from the 10-
years minimum to the 10-years maximum; the third one starts from 
the second half of 2007 and last until the beginning of 2009, with 
a huge drop that set the price at similar levels of 6 years 
before; the fourth is characterized by a positive trend, even if 
it’s weaker than the one in 2003. However, the Market D/E of the 
business is 24,22% and we register a decrease of the mean expected 
return, from 0,39% to 0,002%, and an increase for the level of 
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risk, from 3,49% to 5%, passing from the period before the crisis 
tothe other during the Bear Market. Also in this case we notice 
that Boeing is soffering for the uncertainty of the market. 
 
FIGURE 16: TREND BOEING 
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5. Conclusion  
The recent crisis spreads all over the world its effects, damaging 
structurally the economic development and destructing a 
substantial amount of equity value. The recognized source of this 
fall for the US is the financial sector: according to Bartram and 
Bodnar (2009) we found a drop of the financial system during the 
crisis. We evaluate that the industrial sector follows the 
negative trend of the financial system. This result provides 
evidence to the theory performed by Carlson, King, and Lewis 
(2008), whereby the deterioration in the health of the financial 
sector spreads its effects all over the industrial performance. 
However, we apparently found paradoxical results, which show that 
the IT sector even during the crisis, despite the substantial 
growth in terms of risk investment, has a positive Sharpe Ratio. 
This result can be explained in two ways. The first one, this 
result is against the theory previously described, according to 
which the financial system influences the economic growth. The 
second one takes into account the consideration of the risk: even 
though the Expected Returns per unit of risk increase, the 
investor could be unwilling about investing. The second 
explanation provides evidence about the theories elaborated by 
Guiso, Kashyap, Panetta, and Terlizzese (2002), Petersen, Ryan 
(1995) and Schildbach (2009). The easiness about financing with 
debt (Petersen, Ryan (1995)), make easier to obtain financing with 
debt: this practice is spreading in the U.S. economy and, 
considering that the debt increases the risk of the assets held by 
the company (Schildbach (2009)), the shares of companies following 
financing costs (Guiso, Kashyap, Panetta, and Terlizzese (2002)). 
According to Schildbach (2009) we show how the leverage increase 
the risk of the shares and worsens the performance of the sector 
during the financial crisis. 
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Returns and Risk of the portfolios 
    
      Portfolio 1: 
   
Portfolio 2: 
 Return 2,49% 
   
-0,24% 
Varianz 0,68% 
   
0,05% 
Std. Deviation 8,24% 
   
2,34% 
      covariance -0,07% 
    
      Mixed Portfolio: a = 0,5 0,5 
    Return 1,13% 
    Varianz 0,15% 
    Std. Deviation 3,88% 
 
9,59189E-05 
   
 
Risk Return 
  
 
3,88% 1,13% 
  -2 19,995% -5,704% -0,05713196 -0,285733573 
-1,9 19,069% -5,430% -0,05440050 -0,285280216 
-1,8 18,144% -5,157% -0,05166904 -0,284773151 
-1,7 17,219% -4,884% -0,04893757 -0,2842025 
-1,6 16,295% -4,611% -0,04620611 -0,283555864 
-1,5 15,372% -4,338% -0,04347465 -0,282817482 
-1,4 14,450% -4,065% -0,04074318 -0,281967039 
-1,3 13,528% -3,792% -0,03801172 -0,280977932 
-1,2 12,608% -3,518% -0,03528026 -0,279814707 
-1,1 11,690% -3,245% -0,03254879 -0,278429167 
-1 10,774% -2,972% -0,02981733 -0,276754287 
-0,9 9,860% -2,699% -0,02708587 -0,274694404 
-0,8 8,950% -2,426% -0,02435440 -0,272108827 
-0,7 8,045% -2,153% -0,02162294 -0,268783275 
-0,6 7,146% -1,880% -0,01889147 -0,264377756 
-0,5 6,256% -1,606% -0,01616001 -0,258326158 
-0,4 5,379% -1,333% -0,01342855 -0,249630958 
-0,3 4,525% -1,060% -0,01069708 -0,236416265 
-0,2 3,707% -0,787% -0,00796562 -0,214902722 
-0,1 2,956% -0,514% -0,00523416 -0,17708551 
6,38378E-16 2,338% -0,241% -0,00250269 -0,10706016 
0,1 1,981% 0,032% 0,00022877 0,011548785 
0,2 2,028% 0,306% 0,00296023 0,145940628 
0,3 2,457% 0,579% 0,00569170 0,231673701 
0,4 3,113% 0,852% 0,00842316 0,270616574 
0,5 3,882% 1,125% 0,01115462 0,287326056 
0,6 4,710% 1,398% 0,01388609 0,294808101 
0,7 5,571% 1,671% 0,01661755 0,298307971 
0,8 6,450% 1,944% 0,01934901 0,299964354 
0,9 7,343% 2,218% 0,02208048 0,300712017 
1 8,243% 2,491% 0,02481194 0,300990124 
1,1 9,150% 2,764% 0,02754340 0,301018247 
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1,2 10,061% 3,037% 0,03027487 0,300911838 
1,3 10,975% 3,310% 0,03300633 0,300734035 
1,4 11,892% 3,583% 0,03573780 0,300520386 
1,5 12,811% 3,857% 0,03846926 0,300291289 
1,6 13,731% 4,130% 0,04120072 0,300058555 
1,7 14,652% 4,403% 0,04393219 0,299828994 
1,8 15,575% 4,676% 0,04666365 0,299606448 
1,9 16,498% 4,949% 0,04939511 0,29939297 
2 17,423% 5,222% 0,05212658 0,299189533 
 
Table 1: Financial after 2007 
 
 
 
 
Returns and Risk of the portfolios 
   
      Portfolio 1: 
   
Portfolio 2: 
 Return 1,77% 
   
-0,26% 
Varianz 0,12% 
   
0,03% 
Std. Deviation 3,42% 
   
1,66% 
      covariance -0,02% 
    
      Mixed Portfolio: a = 0,5 0,5 
    Return 0,76% 
    Varianz 0,03% 
    Std. Deviation 1,67% 
 
9,59189E-05 
   
 
Risk Return 
  
 
1,67% 0,76% 
  -2 9,594% -4,302% -0,04311701 -0,449421571 
-1,9 9,175% -4,100% -0,04109360 -0,447875693 
-1,8 8,757% -3,897% -0,03907019 -0,446162476 
-1,7 8,339% -3,695% -0,03704678 -0,444253903 
-1,6 7,922% -3,493% -0,03502337 -0,44211549 
-1,5 7,505% -3,290% -0,03299997 -0,43970434 
-1,4 7,089% -3,088% -0,03097656 -0,436966487 
-1,3 6,674% -2,886% -0,02895315 -0,433833175 
-1,2 6,260% -2,683% -0,02692974 -0,430215584 
-1,1 5,847% -2,481% -0,02490633 -0,425997192 
-1 5,435% -2,279% -0,02288292 -0,421022493 
-0,9 5,025% -2,076% -0,02085951 -0,415079963 
-0,8 4,618% -1,874% -0,01883610 -0,407875674 
-0,7 4,214% -1,672% -0,01681270 -0,398991368 
-0,6 3,813% -1,469% -0,01478929 -0,387815943 
-0,5 3,419% -1,267% -0,01276588 -0,373430359 
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-0,4 3,031% -1,065% -0,01074247 -0,35440942 
-0,3 2,654% -0,862% -0,00871906 -0,328475558 
-0,2 2,294% -0,660% -0,00669565 -0,291903854 
-0,1 1,958% -0,458% -0,00467224 -0,238605431 
6,3838E-16 1,663% -0,255% -0,00264884 -0,159311717 
0,1 1,432% -0,053% -0,00062543 -0,0436614 
0,2 1,303% 0,149% 0,00139798 0,10732801 
0,3 1,303% 0,352% 0,00342139 0,262520839 
0,4 1,434% 0,554% 0,00544480 0,379562256 
0,5 1,666% 0,756% 0,00746821 0,448375672 
0,6 1,962% 0,959% 0,00949162 0,483861056 
0,7 2,298% 1,161% 0,01151503 0,501171296 
0,8 2,658% 1,363% 0,01353843 0,509259796 
0,9 3,035% 1,566% 0,01556184 0,512698111 
1 3,423% 1,768% 0,01758525 0,513762943 
1,1 3,818% 1,970% 0,01960866 0,513606105 
1,2 4,218% 2,173% 0,02163207 0,512825937 
1,3 4,623% 2,375% 0,02365548 0,511741245 
1,4 5,030% 2,577% 0,02567889 0,510525149 
1,5 5,440% 2,780% 0,02770230 0,509272527 
1,6 5,851% 2,982% 0,02972570 0,50803514 
1,7 6,264% 3,185% 0,03174911 0,506840494 
1,8 6,678% 3,387% 0,03377252 0,505702265 
1,9 7,094% 3,589% 0,03579593 0,504626184 
2 7,510% 3,792% 0,03781934 0,503613441 
 
Table 2: Financial before 2007 
 
 
 
Returns and Risk of the portfolios 
    
      Portfolio 1: 
   
Portfolio 2: 
Return 1,52% 
   
-0,11% 
Varianz 0,32% 
   
0,05% 
Std. Deviation 5,62% 
   
2,27% 
      covariance -0,02% 
    
      Mixed Portfolio: a = 0,5 0,5 
    Return 0,70% 
    Varianz 0,08% 
    Std. Deviation 2,83% 
 
9,59189E-05 
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Risk Return 
  
 
2,83% 0,70% 
  -2 14,178% -3,374% -0,03383101 -0,23862 
-1,9 13,540% -3,211% -0,03220129 -0,23782 
-1,8 12,903% -3,048% -0,03057157 -0,23693 
-1,7 12,267% -2,885% -0,02894186 -0,23593 
-1,6 11,632% -2,722% -0,02731214 -0,2348 
-1,5 10,998% -2,559% -0,02568242 -0,23353 
-1,4 10,364% -2,396% -0,02405271 -0,23207 
-1,3 9,733% -2,233% -0,02242299 -0,23039 
-1,2 9,103% -2,070% -0,02079327 -0,22843 
-1,1 8,475% -1,907% -0,01916355 -0,22612 
-1 7,849% -1,744% -0,01753384 -0,22338 
-0,9 7,227% -1,581% -0,01590412 -0,22006 
-0,8 6,609% -1,418% -0,01427440 -0,21597 
-0,7 5,997% -1,255% -0,01264468 -0,21085 
-0,6 5,392% -1,092% -0,01101497 -0,20429 
-0,5 4,797% -0,929% -0,00938525 -0,19566 
-0,4 4,216% -0,766% -0,00775553 -0,18395 
-0,3 3,657% -0,603% -0,00612582 -0,16752 
-0,2 3,130% -0,440% -0,00449610 -0,14365 
-0,1 2,655% -0,277% -0,00286638 -0,10795 
6,38378E-16 2,266% -0,114% -0,00123666 -0,05458 
0,1 2,012% 0,049% 0,00039305 0,019539 
0,2 1,946% 0,212% 0,00202277 0,103927 
0,3 2,088% 0,375% 0,00365249 0,17494 
0,4 2,400% 0,538% 0,00528221 0,220108 
0,5 2,826% 0,701% 0,00691192 0,244551 
0,6 3,324% 0,864% 0,00854164 0,256994 
0,7 3,864% 1,027% 0,01017136 0,2632 
0,8 4,433% 1,190% 0,01180107 0,266213 
0,9 5,020% 1,353% 0,01343079 0,267564 
1 5,619% 1,516% 0,01506051 0,268033 
1,1 6,227% 1,679% 0,01669023 0,268027 
1,2 6,842% 1,842% 0,01831994 0,267766 
1,3 7,461% 2,005% 0,01994966 0,267372 
1,4 8,085% 2,168% 0,02157938 0,266913 
1,5 8,711% 2,331% 0,02320910 0,266428 
1,6 9,340% 2,493% 0,02483881 0,265941 
1,7 9,971% 2,656% 0,02646853 0,265464 
1,8 10,603% 2,819% 0,02809825 0,265004 
1,9 11,237% 2,982% 0,02972796 0,264564 
2 11,871% 3,145% 0,03135768 0,264147 
 
Table 3: Financial 2002-2012 
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Returns and Risk of the portfolios 
    
      Portfolio 1: 
   
Portfolio 2: 
 Return -1,79% 
   
-0,08% 
Varianz 6,74% 
   
0,11% 
Std. Deviation 25,96% 
   
3,32% 
      covariance 0,29% 
    
      Mixed Portfolio: a = 0,5 0,5 
    Return -0,94% 
    Varianz 1,85% 
    Std. Deviation 13,62% 
 
9,592E-05 
   
 
 
Risk Return 
  
 
13,62% -0,94% 
  -2 49,511% 3,360% 3,351% 6,768% 
-1,9 47,011% 3,189% 3,179% 6,762% 
-1,8 44,513% 3,017% 3,007% 6,756% 
-1,7 42,014% 2,845% 2,835% 6,748% 
-1,6 39,517% 2,673% 2,663% 6,740% 
-1,5 37,021% 2,501% 2,492% 6,730% 
-1,4 34,526% 2,329% 2,320% 6,719% 
-1,3 32,032% 2,158% 2,148% 6,706% 
-1,2 29,541% 1,986% 1,976% 6,690% 
-1,1 27,052% 1,814% 1,804% 6,670% 
-1 24,567% 1,642% 1,633% 6,645% 
-0,9 22,086% 1,470% 1,461% 6,614% 
-0,8 19,611% 1,299% 1,289% 6,572% 
-0,7 17,145% 1,127% 1,117% 6,516% 
-0,6 14,693% 0,955% 0,945% 6,434% 
-0,5 12,262% 0,783% 0,773% 6,308% 
-0,4 9,868% 0,611% 0,602% 6,097% 
-0,3 7,546% 0,439% 0,430% 5,696% 
-0,2 5,392% 0,268% 0,258% 4,785% 
-0,1 3,709% 0,096% 0,086% 2,324% 
6,38378E-16 3,316% -0,076% -0,086% -2,582% 
0,1 4,558% -0,248% -0,257% -5,647% 
0,2 6,567% -0,420% -0,429% -6,537% 
0,3 8,832% -0,591% -0,601% -6,805% 
0,4 11,201% -0,763% -0,773% -6,900% 
0,5 13,618% -0,935% -0,945% -6,937% 
0,6 16,063% -1,107% -1,117% -6,951% 
0,7 18,523% -1,279% -1,288% -6,955% 
0,8 20,994% -1,451% -1,460% -6,955% 
0,9 23,473% -1,622% -1,632% -6,953% 
1 25,957% -1,794% -1,804% -6,949% 
1,1 28,444% -1,966% -1,976% -6,946%     
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1,2 30,934% -2,138% -2,147% -6,942% 
1,3 33,427% -2,310% -2,319% -6,938% 
1,4 35,921% -2,481% -2,491% -6,935% 
1,5 38,417% -2,653% -2,663% -6,932% 
1,6 40,914% -2,825% -2,835% -6,928% 
1,7 43,412% -2,997% -3,007% -6,926% 
1,8 45,910% -3,169% -3,178% -6,923% 
1,9 48,410% -3,341% -3,350% -6,920% 
2 50,909% -3,512% -3,522% -6,918% 
 
Table 4: Industrial after 2007 
 
      
 
 
      
Returns and Risk of the portfolios 
    
      Portfolio 1: 
   
Portfolio 2: 
 Return 0,30% 
   
0,26% 
Varianz 0,05% 
   
0,05% 
Std. Deviation 2,30% 
   
2,19% 
      covariance 0,05% 
    
      Mixed Portfolio: a = 0,5 0,5 
    Return 0,28% 
    Varianz 0,05% 
    Std. Deviation 2,19% 
 
9,5919E-05 
  
 
     
      
      
 
Risk Return 
  
 
2,19% 0,28% 
  -2 3,164% 0,174% 0,165% 5,211% 
-1,9 3,091% 0,179% 0,169% 5,472% 
-1,8 3,020% 0,183% 0,173% 5,742% 
-1,7 2,951% 0,187% 0,178% 6,022% 
-1,6 2,884% 0,192% 0,182% 6,311% 
-1,5 2,818% 0,196% 0,186% 6,609% 
-1,4 2,755% 0,200% 0,191% 6,916% 
-1,3 2,694% 0,204% 0,195% 7,231% 
-1,2 2,636% 0,209% 0,199% 7,553% 
-1,1 2,580% 0,213% 0,203% 7,882% 
-1 2,527% 0,217% 0,208% 8,216% 
-0,9 2,477% 0,222% 0,212% 8,555% 
-0,8 2,430% 0,226% 0,216% 8,895% 
-0,7 2,387% 0,230% 0,220% 9,236% 
-0,6 2,347% 0,234% 0,225% 9,575% 
-0,5 2,311% 0,239% 0,229% 9,909% 
-0,4 2,279% 0,243% 0,233% 10,237%      
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-0,3 2,251% 0,247% 0,238% 10,554% 
-0,2 2,227% 0,251% 0,242% 10,859% 
-0,1 2,208% 0,256% 0,246% 11,148% 
6,38378E-16 2,193% 0,260% 0,250% 11,419% 
0,1 2,182% 0,264% 0,255% 11,670% 
0,2 2,177% 0,269% 0,259% 11,897% 
0,3 2,176% 0,273% 0,263% 12,099% 
0,4 2,179% 0,277% 0,267% 12,274% 
0,5 2,188% 0,281% 0,272% 12,423% 
0,6 2,201% 0,286% 0,276% 12,544% 
0,7 2,218% 0,290% 0,280% 12,638% 
0,8 2,240% 0,294% 0,285% 12,705% 
0,9 2,266% 0,298% 0,289% 12,746% 
1 2,297% 0,303% 0,293% 12,764% 
1,1 2,331% 0,307% 0,297% 12,759% 
1,2 2,369% 0,311% 0,302% 12,733% 
1,3 2,411% 0,316% 0,306% 12,690% 
1,4 2,457% 0,320% 0,310% 12,629% 
1,5 2,505% 0,324% 0,315% 12,555% 
1,6 2,557% 0,328% 0,319% 12,469% 
1,7 2,611% 0,333% 0,323% 12,372% 
1,8 2,669% 0,337% 0,327% 12,267% 
1,9 2,728% 0,341% 0,332% 12,154% 
2 2,791% 0,345% 0,336% 12,037% 
 
Table 5: Industrial before 2007 
 
 
 
      
 
Returns and Risk of the prtfolios 
    
      Portfolio 1: 
   
Portfolio 2: 
 Return 0,23% 
   
0,18% 
Varianz 0,16% 
   
0,09% 
Std. Deviation 3,95% 
   
2,96% 
      covariance 0,10% 
    
      Mixed Portfolio: a = 0,5 0,5 
    Return 0,21% 
    Varianz 0,11% 
    Std. Deviation 3,30% 
 
9,592E-05 
   
 
 
Risk Return 
  
 
3,30% 0,21% 
  -2 4,989% 0,071% 0,061% 1,225%      
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-1,9 4,810% 0,076% 0,066% 1,382% 
-1,8 4,635% 0,081% 0,072% 1,551% 
-1,7 4,465% 0,087% 0,077% 1,731% 
-1,6 4,299% 0,092% 0,083% 1,923% 
-1,5 4,138% 0,098% 0,088% 2,127% 
-1,4 3,984% 0,103% 0,093% 2,345% 
-1,3 3,836% 0,108% 0,099% 2,576% 
-1,2 3,696% 0,114% 0,104% 2,819% 
-1,1 3,564% 0,119% 0,110% 3,075% 
-1 3,441% 0,125% 0,115% 3,340% 
-0,9 3,330% 0,130% 0,120% 3,615% 
-0,8 3,229% 0,135% 0,126% 3,894% 
-0,7 3,141% 0,141% 0,131% 4,174% 
-0,6 3,067% 0,146% 0,137% 4,450% 
-0,5 3,008% 0,151% 0,142% 4,717% 
-0,4 2,964% 0,157% 0,147% 4,968% 
-0,3 2,937% 0,162% 0,153% 5,197% 
-0,2 2,927% 0,168% 0,158% 5,400% 
-0,1 2,933% 0,173% 0,163% 5,572% 
6,38378E-16 2,956% 0,178% 0,169% 5,710% 
0,1 2,996% 0,184% 0,174% 5,814% 
0,2 3,052% 0,189% 0,180% 5,885% 
0,3 3,122% 0,195% 0,185% 5,924% 
0,4 3,207% 0,200% 0,190% 5,936% 
0,5 3,304% 0,205% 0,196% 5,924% 
0,6 3,413% 0,211% 0,201% 5,892% 
0,7 3,533% 0,216% 0,207% 5,845% 
0,8 3,663% 0,221% 0,212% 5,785% 
0,9 3,801% 0,227% 0,217% 5,716% 
1 3,947% 0,232% 0,223% 5,641% 
1,1 4,100% 0,238% 0,228% 5,562% 
1,2 4,259% 0,243% 0,233% 5,481% 
1,3 4,424% 0,248% 0,239% 5,398% 
1,4 4,594% 0,254% 0,244% 5,316% 
1,5 4,768% 0,259% 0,250% 5,235% 
1,6 4,946% 0,265% 0,255% 5,156% 
1,7 5,127% 0,270% 0,260% 5,078% 
1,8 5,312% 0,275% 0,266% 5,003% 
1,9 5,499% 0,281% 0,271% 4,931% 
2 5,689% 0,286% 0,277% 4,861% 
 
Table 6: Industrial 2002-2012  
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Returns and Risk of the portfolios 
    
      Portfolio 1: 
   
Portfolio 2: 
 Return 4,08% 
   
-0,42% 
Varianz 3,14% 
   
0,21% 
Std. Deviation 17,72% 
   
4,54% 
      covariance -0,40% 
    
      Mixed Portfolio: a = 0,5 0,5 
    Return 1,83% 
    Varianz 0,64% 
    Std. Deviation 7,97% 
 
9,5919E-05 
  
 
      
      
 
Risk Return 
  
 
7,97% 1,83% 
  -2 0,438451813 -0,094 -0,0941837 -0,214809628 
-1,9 0,418151611 -0,09 -0,089688 -0,214486881 
-1,8 0,397858051 -0,085 -0,0851924 -0,214127622 
-1,7 0,377572205 -0,081 -0,0806968 -0,213725377 
-1,6 0,357295387 -0,076 -0,0762011 -0,213272066 
-1,5 0,337029226 -0,072 -0,0717055 -0,21275748 
-1,4 0,316775768 -0,067 -0,0672099 -0,212168541 
-1,3 0,296537615 -0,063 -0,0627142 -0,211488233 
-1,2 0,27631813 -0,058 -0,0582186 -0,210694027 
-1,1 0,256121735 -0,054 -0,0537229 -0,209755503 
-1 0,235954359 -0,049 -0,0492273 -0,208630631 
-0,9 0,215824137 -0,045 -0,0447317 -0,207259814 
-0,8 0,195742531 -0,04 -0,040236 -0,205555909 
-0,7 0,175726211 -0,036 -0,0357404 -0,203386833 
-0,6 0,155800341 -0,031 -0,0312448 -0,200543599 
-0,5 0,136004681 -0,027 -0,0267491 -0,196677971 
-0,4 0,116405681 -0,022 -0,0222535 -0,191171842 
-0,3 0,097122468 -0,018 -0,0177579 -0,182839793 
-0,2 0,078388438 -0,013 -0,0132622 -0,169185863 
-0,1 0,060714107 -0,009 -0,0087666 -0,14439114 
6,38378E-16 0,045355711 -0,004 -0,0042709 -0,094165489 
0,1 0,035462098 3E-04 0,00022469 0,006336165 
0,2 0,035881226 0,005 0,00472033 0,131554315 
0,3 0,046334075 0,009 0,00921597 0,198902568 
0,4 0,061933132 0,014 0,0137116 0,221393664 
0,5 0,079712366 0,018 0,01820724 0,228411731 
0,6 0,098498182 0,023 0,02270288 0,230490304 
0,7 0,117810036 0,027 0,02719851 0,230867532 
0,8 0,137426341 0,032 0,03169415 0,230626445 
0,9 0,157233191 0,036 0,03618979 0,230166321 
1 0,177166688 0,041 0,04068542 0,229644872 
1,1 0,197188429 0,045 0,04518106 0,229126313      
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1,2 0,217274021 0,05 0,04967669 0,228636144 
1,3 0,237407257 0,054 0,05417233 0,228183129 
1,4 0,257576966 0,059 0,05866797 0,227768686 
1,5 0,277775202 0,063 0,0631636 0,227391081 
1,6 0,297996166 0,068 0,06765924 0,22704735 
1,7 0,318235525 0,072 0,07215488 0,226734198 
1,8 0,338489978 0,077 0,07665051 0,226448396 
1,9 0,35875697 0,081 0,08114615 0,226186962 
2 0,379034489 0,086 0,08564179 0,225947211 
 
Table 7: Information technology after 2007 
 
 
 
 
 
Returns and Risk of the prtfolios 
    
      Portfolio 1: 
   
Portfolio 2: 
 Return 3,29% 
   
-0,51% 
Varianz 2,12% 
   
0,20% 
Std. Deviation 14,55% 
   
4,43% 
      covariance -0,38% 
    
      Mixed Portfolio: a = 0,5 0,5 
    Return 1,39% 
    Varianz 0,39% 
    Std. Deviation 6,22% 
 
9,592E-05 
   
 
 
Risk Return 
  
 
6,22% 1,39% 
  -2 0,3850524 -0,08121 -0,0813033 -0,211148653 
-1,9 0,3675613 -0,0774 -0,0774994 -0,210847493 
-1,8 0,3500757 -0,0736 -0,0736955 -0,210512978 
-1,7 0,3325963 -0,0698 -0,0698916 -0,210139325 
-1,6 0,3151243 -0,06599 -0,0660877 -0,209719347 
-1,5 0,2976608 -0,06219 -0,0622837 -0,209244011 
-1,4 0,2802076 -0,05838 -0,0584798 -0,208701812 
-1,3 0,2627667 -0,05458 -0,0546759 -0,208077878 
-1,2 0,2453406 -0,05078 -0,050872 -0,207352661 
-1,1 0,2279328 -0,04697 -0,0470681 -0,206499983 
-1 0,2105478 -0,04317 -0,0432642 -0,205484026 
-0,9 0,1931918 -0,03936 -0,0394603 -0,204254555 
-0,8 0,1758733 -0,03556 -0,0356564 -0,202739076 
-0,7 0,1586047 -0,03176 -0,0318525 -0,20082939 
-0,6 0,1414042 -0,02795 -0,0280486 -0,198357448 
-0,5 0,1243001 -0,02415 -0,0242447 -0,19504946 
-0,4 0,1073385 -0,02034 -0,0204408 -0,190432696 
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-0,3 0,0905995 -0,01654 -0,0166369 -0,183630816 
-0,2 0,0742337 -0,01274 -0,0128329 -0,172872264 
-0,1 0,058555 -0,00893 -0,009029 -0,154197566 
6,38378E-16 0,0442991 -0,00513 -0,0052251 -0,117951337 
0,1 0,0333436 -0,00133 -0,0014212 -0,042623679 
0,2 0,0296116 0,00248 0,0023827 0,080464412 
0,3 0,0354623 0,00628 0,0061866 0,174455415 
0,4 0,047476 0,01009 0,0099905 0,210432607 
0,5 0,0621775 0,01389 0,0137944 0,221855431 
0,6 0,0780626 0,01769 0,0175983 0,22543845 
0,7 0,0945366 0,0215 0,0214022 0,226390762 
0,8 0,1113384 0,0253 0,0252061 0,226391953 
0,9 0,1283394 0,02911 0,02901 0,226041597 
1 0,1454696 0,03291 0,0328139 0,2255725 
1,1 0,1626883 0,03671 0,0366179 0,225079773 
1,2 0,1799701 0,04052 0,0404218 0,224602611 
1,3 0,1972984 0,04432 0,0442257 0,224156211 
1,4 0,214662 0,04813 0,0480296 0,223745151 
1,5 0,2320528 0,05193 0,0518335 0,223369303 
1,6 0,2494653 0,05573 0,0556374 0,223026534 
1,7 0,2668952 0,05954 0,0594413 0,222713986 
1,8 0,2843393 0,06334 0,0632452 0,222428657 
1,9 0,3017951 0,06715 0,0670491 0,222167681 
2 0,3192607 0,07095 0,070853 0,221928428 
 
Table 8: Information technology before 2007 
 
 
 
      
Returns and Risk of the prtfolios 
    
      Portfolio 1: 
   
Portfolio 2: 
 Return 2,30% 
   
-0,24% 
Varianz 1,52% 
   
0,15% 
Std. Deviation 12,32% 
   
3,86% 
      covariance -0,16% 
    
      Mixed Portfolio: a = 0,5 0,5 
    Return 1,03% 
    Varianz 0,34% 
    Std. Deviation 5,82% 
    
   
9,592E-05 
   
 
Risk Return 
  
 
5,82% 1,03% 
  -2 30,473% -5,307% -0,05316092 -0,174454337 
-1,9 29,074% -5,053% -0,05062618 -0,174127691 
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-1,8 27,676% -4,800% -0,04809144 -0,173762869 
-1,7 26,280% -4,546% -0,0455567 -0,173352948 
-1,6 24,884% -4,293% -0,04302196 -0,172889263 
-1,5 23,490% -4,039% -0,04048722 -0,172360842 
-1,4 22,097% -3,786% -0,03795248 -0,171753591 
-1,3 20,706% -3,532% -0,03541774 -0,171049138 
-1,2 19,318% -3,279% -0,032883 -0,170223119 
-1,1 17,932% -3,025% -0,03034826 -0,169242605 
-1 16,550% -2,772% -0,02781352 -0,168062108 
-0,9 15,172% -2,518% -0,02527878 -0,166617223 
-0,8 13,800% -2,265% -0,02274404 -0,164814132 
-0,7 12,436% -2,011% -0,0202093 -0,162511601 
-0,6 11,082% -1,758% -0,01767456 -0,159488763 
-0,5 9,743% -1,504% -0,01513982 -0,155384581 
-0,4 8,427% -1,251% -0,01260508 -0,14957798 
-0,3 7,145% -0,997% -0,01007034 -0,140937978 
-0,2 5,920% -0,744% -0,0075356 -0,12728429 
-0,1 4,796% -0,490% -0,00500086 -0,104269194 
6,38378E-16 3,862% -0,237% -0,00246612 -0,063861192 
0,1 3,283% 0,016% 6,86236E-05 0,002090104 
0,2 3,256% 0,270% 0,002603364 0,079945639 
0,3 3,793% 0,523% 0,005138104 0,135467187 
0,4 4,704% 0,777% 0,007672844 0,163123565 
0,5 5,816% 1,030% 0,010207585 0,175521522 
0,6 7,034% 1,284% 0,012742325 0,181158682 
0,7 8,312% 1,537% 0,015277065 0,183801374 
0,8 9,626% 1,791% 0,017811805 0,185045816 
0,9 10,963% 2,044% 0,020346546 0,18560046 
1 12,315% 2,298% 0,022881286 0,185799814 
1,1 13,678% 2,551% 0,025416026 0,185811128 
1,2 15,050% 2,805% 0,027950766 0,185722117 
1,3 16,427% 3,058% 0,030485506 0,185580549 
1,4 17,809% 3,312% 0,033020247 0,185413169 
1,5 19,195% 3,565% 0,035554987 0,18523522 
1,6 20,583% 3,819% 0,038089727 0,185055453 
1,7 21,974% 4,072% 0,040624467 0,184878853 
1,8 23,366% 4,326% 0,043159208 0,184708188 
1,9 24,760% 4,579% 0,045693948 0,184544896 
2 26,156% 4,832% 0,048228688 0,184389616 
 
Table 9: Information technology 2002-2012 
 
 
 
